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Integrating the dark side of competition into explanations of business failures: Evidence from 
a developing economy.   
Abstract 
In spite of the growing body of literature on the bright side of inter-firm relationships, limited 
attention has been paid to the dark side of inter-firm relationships. Using insights of serial 
entrepreneurs in a developing economy, we articulate the mechanisms through which adverse 
UXPRXUV DQG PLVLQIRUPDWLRQ SHUSHWUDWHG E\ ULYDOV¶ ILUPV XQGHUPLQH VPDOO EXVLQHVVHV DQG OHDG WR
decline and eventual collapse. We uncovered that the rumours were made more potent when 
combined with other factors such as prior history of poor and faulty products, sensitivity of industry 
and intense competition from rival firms in reducing the life chance of firms. Our study also 
uncovered that inter-firm backstabbing leads former business owners to form a negative perception 
of former competitors and their organisations even after their business collapsed. We conclude by 
articulating the theoretical and practical implications.  
 
 








Over the past few decades, a growing body of literature has suggested that inter-firm relationships 
can provide conditions for innovation to thrive and access to scarce financial and human capital 
(Wassmer, Paquin and Sharma, 2014; Noordhoff, Kyriakopoulos, Moorman, Pauwels and Dellaert, 
2011). 2QH VWUHDP RI UHVHDUFK URRWHG LQ WKH FRQFHSW RI ³FR-RSHWLWLRQ´ KDV VXJJHVWHG WKDW deep 
collaboration and co-operation even among rivals as route to sustainable competitive advantage 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Bouncken and Fredrich, 2016; Yu, Subramaniam and 
Cannella, 2013). In spite of a growing body of research on this bright side of inter-firm 
relationships, limited attention has been paid to the effects of dark side of inter-firm relationships 
and how they unfold (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Villena, Revilla and Choi, 2011; Reuber and 
Fischer, 2010).  
Although a handful of studies have examined dark-side of inter-firm relationships issues 
such as conflicts (Deutsch, 1958), opportunistic behaviour (Das, 2006) and deviant behaviour 
(Buchanan, 2008; Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips, 2006), to date, much of the existing literature has 
overlooked the issue. Although some scholars have hinted that external factors such as business 
rivalry and  inter-firm backstabbing can lead to bankruptcy of firms (see van Iterson and Clegg, 
2008; Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004), it remains unclear how the effects unfold to precipitate 
business failure. This omission is surprising given that inter-firm backstabbing remains a unique 
and common feature of business practices in informal and under-developed economies. To date, 
business failure and business ethics scholars (e.g., Walsh and Bartunek, 2011; Stokes and 
Blackburn, 2002) have largely failed to articulate the underlying dynamics of backstabbing and its 
effects.  
Our primary purpose in this paper is to examine the mechanisms through which inter-firm 
backstabbing unfolds to precipitate business failure. We focus on Ghana as an exemplar setting to 
LOOXVWUDWHRXU DQDO\VLV)LUVW*KDQD¶VGHPRFUDF\DQG LWV SURJUHVVRYHU WKHSDVW IHZGHFDGHVKDYH
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been regarded as charting course for African democracy (Robson and Freel, 2008). Unlike other 
$IULFDQ FRXQWULHV LQ *KDQD LQ WKH SDVW WZR GHFDGHV ³WKH SUHVLGHQF\ KDV WZLFH FKDQJHG KDQGV
ZLWKRXWYLROHQFH´EXWUDWKHUWKURXJKIUHHDQGIDLUGHPRFUDWLFHOHFWLRQV7KH(FRQRPLVW: 50). 
,QGHHG *KDQD LV UHJDUGHG DV RQH RI $IULFD¶V PRUH SURJUHVVLYH HFRnomies (Rice, 2013). 
Increasingly, the country has now come to be regarded as a model for Africa and thereby 
reinforcing its past history since the late 1950s as torchbearer of African aspirations (Amankwah-
Amoah and Debrah, 2010). Furthermore, Ghana is onH RI :HVW $IULFD¶V ELJJHVW HFRQRPLHV DQG
therefore the experiences of former business owners provide a fertile ground for shedding light on 
business failure. 
The study makes several contributions to the literature. First, our study contributes to the 
business failure research (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004, 2010) by deepening our understanding of 
KRZIDFWRUVRXWVLGHWKHIRFDOILUP¶VHQYLURQPHQWFDQLQWHUDFWZLWKILUP-level factors to precipitate 
business failure. Second, we integrate business failure (Watson and Everett, 1993) and inter-firm 
relationship (Anderson and Jap, 2005) literatures to articulate mechanisms through which inter-firm 
backstabbing unfolds to contribute to small business failures. The study elucidates the processes of 
decline and factors leading to business failure (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). Furthermore, in spite 
of the clear potential for cross fertilisation, the literatures on business failure and inter-firm 
backstabbing have developed in isolation. We deviate from much of the existing literature by 
developing a framework of factors of how inter-firm backstabbing lead to business failure. In so 
doing, our study contributes to the burgeoning stream of research on inter-firm relationship 
(Anderson and Jap, 2005; Buchanan, 2008).  
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. First, we review the literature on business 
failure and inter-firm backstabbing. We then set out the approaches adopted to collect our data. 
Then, we present the findings of the study. We conclude by outlining implications of our findings. 
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Business failure  and inter-firm backstabbing: a unified perspective  
The literatures on business failure and inter-firm backstabbing represent two relevant streams of 
research. %\EXVLQHVV IDLOXUHZHDUH UHIHUULQJ WR³WKHDFWXDO demise of the organization when an 
HQWLUH FRPSDQ\ JRHVRXWRIEXVLQHVV« WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQFRPSOHWHO\ FHDVHV WR H[LVW´ 0DUNV and 
Vansteenkiste, 2008: 810).  
Broadly speaking, there are two dominant theoretical perspectives on business failure: the 
deterministic and voluntaristic perspectives (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004, 2010).The deterministic 
perspective contends that the cause of business failures is attributed to external environmental 
factors (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016; Heracleous and Werres, 2016). Past studies have identified 
external factors such as changes in technological change, regulations, government interference, 
competition and economic decline as contributors to business failure (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 
2004). The voluntaristic school argues that business failure is attributed to firm-level factors. Recent 
scholarly works have identified factors such as mismanagement, loss of key personnel and weak 
financial position as causes of business failure (Amankwah-Amoah and Zhang, 2015; Heracleous 
and Werres, 2016). In sharp contrast to the view which considers business failure as solely an 
outcome of external factors, it has also been asserted that business failure is a product of 
accumulated errors, decisions, and leadership style which ultimately contribute to business failure 
(Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, 2010, 2014). Studies indicate that prior experience of business 
failure can offer serial entrepreneurs the opportunity to learn relevant lessons for new ventures 
(Lafontaine and Shaw 2016; Simmons, Carr, Hsu and Shu, 2016). 
Research has shown that an inter-firm backstabbing is a key dimension of the dark side of 
inter-firm relationships (Cavanagh, Moberg and Velasquez, 1981).  By inter-firm backstabbing, we 
are referring to host of economic, social and political measures designed by a firm or others to 
undermine the positions and operations of rival firms in an overt or covert manner to help prolong 
their existence (Cavanagh et al., 1981; Harvey, 1989; see also Clegg et al., 2006). For inter-firm 
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backstabbing to occur, there must be at least three parties: the perpetrator and/messenger 
(originating firms), witnesses and the victim (recipient firm) (Buchanan, 2008; Harvey, 1989).  
Backstabbing have been conceptualised to include actions such as spreading rumours, sabotage, 
undermining and taking undue credit for the works of others (Malone and Hayes, 2012; Vecchio, 
1995). 6RPHVFKRODUVKDYHVXJJHVWHGWKDWLVRIWHQPRWLYDWHGZLWKWKHLQWHQWLRQWR³GDPDJHGLVUXSW
RU VXEYHUW WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V RSHUDWLRQV IRU WKH personal purposes of the saboteur by creating 
unfavourable publicity, embarrassment, delays in production, damage to property, the destruction of 
ZRUNLQJ UHODWLRQVKLSV RU WKH KDUPLQJ RI HPSOR\HHV RU FXVWRPHUV´ &ULQR, 1994: 312; see also 
Pozner, 2008). It may include dirty tricks and spreading misinformation aimed at destabilising other 
firms and even bringing about their demise. These acts are often strategically designed to 
undermine the operations of rivals to the benefit of the perpetrators or those aligned to them. Past 
studies have demonstrated that one of the most visible manifestations of inter-firm backstabbing is 
through rumours (Allport and Postman, 1947).  
A rumour can be defined as ³an unverified account or explanation of events circulating from 
person to person and pertaining to an object, event, or issue in public concern´ (Peterson and Gist, 
1951: 159). Rumours have traditionally circulated from person to person through word of 
mouth (Allport and Postman, 1947), but  one recent and promising development in this line of 
research is that rumours are now increasingly disseminated through new media by individuals 
(Doerr, Fouz and Friedrich, 2012; Edy and RisleyǦBaird, 2016; Kwon, Bang, Egnoto and Rao, 
2016). Indeed, the pace at which such misinformation travels has accelerated with the rise of the 
internet and blog sites (see Edy and RisleyǦBaird, 2016; Rojecki and Meraz, 2016). However, 
commercial rumours as a strategy can be referred to as any dissemination of misinformation about a 
business and its products aim at disrupting or harming its operations (Kimmel and Audrain-
Pontevia, 2010). Researchers studying the issue have emphasised that some organisations or 
individuals who feel they are powerless in the face of changing market conditions are more likely to 
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engage in backstabbing in an attempt to change the course of events and improve their survival 
chances whilst undermining those of others (Buchanan, 2008; DiBattista, 1991).  
Another line of research suggests that inter-firm backstabbing may stem from envy of others 
as some firms achieve relative success in their locality; they become targets for rivals who seek to 
use underhand tactics to lure their customers away or even destroy their businesses (see Harvey, 
1989). Envy may also stems from lack of superior reputation, products or brands that enable the 
EXVLQHVVWRRXWFRPSHWHLWVULYDOV%\FRPSDULQJWKHLUILUPV¶ZHDNPDUNHWSRVLWLRQUHODWLYHWRRWKHU
firms, some small businesses may lurch towards employing underhand tactics such as engineering 
and spreading of false information in an attempt to undermine the rival firms (Harvey, 1989; Mui, 
1995). Indeed, envy can provoke sabotage from rival individuals or businesses (Mui, 1995).  
An emerging but promising body of literature has suggested that inter-firm backstabbing 
PD\VWHPIURPWKHGHVLUHIRUULYDOILUPV¶FXVWRPHUEDVHZKLFKWKHQXUJHVVRPHILUPVWRHQJDJHLQ
deliberate acts of sabotage (see Smith and Kim, 2007; Silver and Sabini, 1978). This often occurs as 
they try to gain competitive advaQWDJHWKURXJK³GLUW\WDFWLFV´WR OXUHFXVWRPHUV%XFKDQDQ
Harvey, 1989). Prior research has indicated that inter-firm backstabbing is relatively common and 
may unfold unknowingly to affect the business, deprive it of its customers, undermine any corporate 
credibility and facilitate brand switching among customers (Malone and Hayes, 2012; Harvey, 
1989). The effects may include shortening the life chances of rival firms, bringing about its 
departure from an industry.  
Another relevant literature is the ³LQVWLWXWLRQDO YRLGV´ perspective (Khanna and Palepu, 
1999; North, 1990). Past studies have demonstrated that developing economies are characterised by 
³LQVWLWXWLRQDOYRLGV´.KDQQDand Palepu, 1999; Luo and Tung, 2007; Miller, Lee, Chang and Le 
Breton-Miller, 2009; North, 1990). It has been demonstrated that the weak contract enforcement 
regimes, inadequate infrastructure, lack of adequate disclosure and weak governance can curtails 
the activities of small and large businesses (Khanna and Palepu, 1999, 2006). Furthermore, many 
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institutions such as government departments and courts are often characterized by high degree of 
bureaucracy and inefficiency (Ireland, Tihanyi and Webb, 2008). These weak formal institutional 
factors can create conditions for opportunistic behaviours to occur (Spicer, McDermott and Kogut, 
2000). A line of research has suggested that poorly formulated government policies in these 
economies can undercut legitimate forms of entrepreneurship (Ireland et al., 2008; Kolvereid and 
Obloj, 1994). Given that advanced economies are characterised by well-functioning legal system 
and legal redress and enforcement mechanisms (Khanna and Palepu, 1999), the spread of rumour 
for commercial purpose might be curtailed by these factors. Although some scholars have hinted 
that the dark side inter-firm relationships can lead to bankruptcy of firms (see van Iterson and 
Clegg, 2008), it remains unclear how the effects unfold and precipitate small business failure. This 
study seeks to fill this void by focusing on under-developed economies and societies characterised 
by informal institutional structures.  
Research design and data sources 
In order to provide in-depth understanding required in this largely underexplored area of how inter-
firm backstabbing unfolds and interacts with other factors to precipitate business failure, we 
adopted qualitative multiple case approach (Birkinshaw, Brannen and Tung, 2011; Siggelkow, 
2007). This study is a part of a larger comprehensive study of business failures in developing 
markets. In this direction, the issue of successive entrepreneurial engagement after business failure 
have been examined elsewhere (e.g. Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2016). Therefore, we limit our 
analysis here to mainly the inter-firm backstabbing. Our adoption of inductive multiple cases was 
reinforced by the fact that insights from multiple cases are often considered more compelling and 
robust (Yin, 2009; Gartner and Birley, 2002). Indeed, past studies have shown that the multiple case 
study approach is particularly useful in exploring unexplored and sensitive issues of small business 
failure (Walsh and Bartunek, 2011).  
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We were able to gain access to the former business owners through direct approach, 
networking and the snowballing approach (direct referrals), which are particularly effective in 
conducting studies in Africa (Acquaah, 2007). Participants were chosen because of their previous 
experience of starting businesses which have now ceased operations. Some have moved on to start 
new businesses, are currently unemployed, have found employment in other organisations, or are 
still recovering from the shock of this experience. The participants were former owners of small to 
medium-sized enterprises in Ghana. The participants were selected across multiple industries from 
the two main cities in the country: Accra and Kumasi. In all, we conducted a total of 22 semi-
structured interviews with former business owners who each represent a business which has ceased 
operation. It must be noted that in many instances, the potential informants were reluctant to discuss 
their experiences and turned down the opportunity to take part in the study.  
The study used a semi-structured interview which allowed a degree of flexibility in 
exploring some issues. Before the interviews started, we provided an assurance of interview 
confidentiality. In the first part of the interview questions were aimed at eliciting background 
information on the participants including the business history, number of employees, qualifications 
and the sources of finance at founding. Here, they were asked questions such as: What was the 
history of your business? How did it start? What was the source of finance? What qualifications did 
you possess at the start of your business? The participants were asked about the underhand role 
played by other rival firms in spreading misinformation, gossip, rumours and sabotage and the part 
this played in the decision to close the business. Here, they were asked about the nature of 
misinformation imparted by rival firms. They were also asked about their responses to signs of 
GHFOLQHDQGWKUHDWVSRVHGE\RWKHUILUPVUHVSRQVHVWRFXVWRPHUV¶FRPSODLQWVDQGJHQHUDOFKDQJHVLQ
the environment. The informants were then asked about the process of business failure and the steps 
taken to mitigate failure. Here the questions posed included: ³What were the warning signals about 
the state of the business?´ In addition, they were asked about the post-event experiences with 
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questions including: ³How has the business failure affected you?´ ³What aspect of your old 
business was preserved?´  
The interviews lasted for an average of 60 minutes. The data collection took place in early 
2013. In order to ensure the accuracy and clarity of our findings, we conducted multiple follow-up 
interviews with some informants, and used emails and phone calls to seek clarification. In some 
cases, transcripts were delivered to informants to help check the accuracy of our story.  
Data analysis 
The data analysis was complemented with materials such as newsletters, posters and business 
reports obtained from the former owners. We also utilised secondary data acquired from the Ghana 
Statistical Service and GhanaWeb. The secondary data provided insights of small business 
registrations and closures. We also obtained press stories on small businesses, and challenges and 
problems faced by local entrepreneurs such as access to finance, competition, cost of materials, 
effects of corporate political activities on small business, and illegitimate behaviours by some firms. 
The data were analysed using a within-case and cross-case approach articulated by Yin (2009) and 
Eisenhardt (1989) to help chart the cause of the businesses failure but more importantly the role 
played by inter-firm backstabbing factors. 
 The analysis began b\ HVWDEOLVKLQJ SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ KLVWRULHV DQG WKRVH RI WKHLU IRUPHU EXVLQHVVHV
which provided the basis for both within-case and cross-case analysis. The within-case analysis 
started by establishing the founding conditions of each firm, their life stories, the processes of 
decline, early-warning signals and factors that led to the exit. Then we explored the sequence of 
events in each firm from the insights of the founders. The in-depth understanding of these issues 
provided the basis for the cross-case analysis to commence. Table 1 provides details of the 22 
cases/participants including the nature of their business, prior experience at founding, qualifications 
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and age of the firms at the time of exit. The names of participants have been omitted to protect the 
anonymity. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Findings 
Our findings indicate that rumours proved to be a powerful force in sealing the fate of the firms. 
Participants experienced the detrimental effects of rumours on their business, image and reputation. 
Below, we present our findings from the cases and elucidate the process through which rumours 
were spread by rival businesses as a deliberate competitive weapon or market strategy to undermine 
consumer loyalty and tarnish the image of small businesses such as stain firm brand images leading 
to consumers switching to the rival.  
Embryonic stage  
For six of the cases (C, E, G, M, R and V), the process of uncovering rumours  began by uncovering 
the factors that something was amiss when demand started shrinking during special occasions such 
as the Easter and Christmas seasons, when all goods are often sold out. They started investigating 
the matter which was traced partly to rumours spread by hawkers who were allegedly paid by a 
rival firm. As Participant M remarked:  
³I can tell you that it was XXX who hired two men to spread the rumours about my business 
« )RU WZR ZHHNV WKH PHQ VSUHDG WKLV UXPRXU DURXQG WKH DUHD « , IRXQG RXW DIWHU WKH
business closed from a close friend that it was him.´  
Our findings indicate that there appears to be an inherent value for some firms to spreading 
misinformation as a means of building an atmosphere of distrust and undermining the basis of rival 
ILUPV¶UHODWLYHVXFFHVV Such was the intense and debilitating nature of the rumours, the businesses 
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began to suffer. The main objective of the rumours was mainly WR HQKDQFH WKH ILUP¶V VWDQGLQJ
UHODWLYH WR WKRVH VHHQ DV ULYDOV ZKLOVW DW WKH VDPH WLPH XQGHUPLQLQJ WKH ULYDOV¶ DWWUDFWLYHQHVV to 
customers and even some co-investors. In the case of Participant R, the rumours about ³potential 
looming problems´ with regulators and government agencies seizing assets of the business and 
damaging rumours about dangerous materials used at the beauty salon forced one co-investor to 
withdraw his investment further pushing the business towards bankruptcy. As the former owner 
puts it: 
³My life was turned upside down. Everything was going well until suddenly things changed, 
people stopped coming to the salon. I contacted a few people but they all said they were 
GRLQJ WKHLU KDLU DW KRPH « , ODWHU GLVFRYHUHG WKHVH IDOVH VWRULHV RQO\ DIWHU WKH EXVLQHVV
closed.´ 
This is further illustrated by the case of Participant E. The owner-manager borrowed money 
from a friend to start the business, buying clothing bales to sell to retailers. The business was slow 
to start, however, through determination the owner was managing to pay back the investor friend on 
a monthly basis with the returns from the business. He realised one day that the quality of the bales 
was not up to standard so he contacted the suppliers to rectify the problem. The supplier was able to 
rectify the problem within a short space of time and the quality of the bales had returned to normal 
standard. Nonetheless, some of the bales sold to the retailers had leaked colours in the process of 
turning them into clothing. Although this had happened on a minor scale and only to one retailer, a 
rumour was started that all his goods were a fire and health hazard. The damage to his reputation 
was so severe that he could no longer keep his business open. He commented:  
³If by some means somebody says something bad about your business and everybody comes 
to believe them, it can kill your business in no time; people don¶WFDUHZKHWKHULWLVWUXHRU
not, your business will be destroyed because of a very minor thing, and all the effort you 
have put it in counts for less than nothing, because now you are in debt as well.´ 
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Firm-specific characteristics  
One surprising aspect of our findings was that prior history of faulty, defective products or 
contaminated materials made rumours and misinformation more potent in reducing the life chances 
of the firms. For instance, Participant C started his laundry business through the help of an investor. 
He possessed previous marketing experience, thus he was hoping to deliver a good return on the 
investment. However, the cleaning equipment he was able to purchase was second hand. But after a 
while customers started to complain about torn clothes. This started to damage the reputation of the 
company. Because of these problems, one rival firm started a rumour that all the clothes cleaned by 
the business got damaged, which significantly affected the business. In this particular case, the firm 
appears to have overlooked hazardous practices and conditions which provided the basis for the 
rumours to grow. The experiences of the few customers provided the foundation for the rumours to 
spread with devastating consequences for the business. Although the owner repaired the machines, 
the repeated breakdowns, in tandem with the rumours, made it difficult to repair the reputation of 
the business and attract customers, and finally the business failed. He stated: 
 ³How can I keep repairing these machines, WKHPDFKLQHVDUHROGVRWKH\¶OONHHSEUHDNLQJ
GRZQHYHU\WLPH,UHSDLULWWKH\EUHDNGRZQDJDLQ2WKHUVZHUHGRLQJWKHGHYLO¶VZRUNWR
destroy the business with their rumours. I had enough and decided to close the business.´  
Furthermore, an unlikely source of rumours in two cases (B and H) was some former 
employees intent on revenge for being fired by their former employer. They acted for an outside 
firm. Another Participant H recalled: 
³After I let her go, there gossips and then false information about how we make our 
products. She claimed we use fake materials and was party to this. It was believable to those 
outside because she worked for me. I tried to explain but no one was listening to our story´ 
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Participant B designed a process of finding a house to buy or rent and provided information 
for a prospective buyer or renter about the property. This participant was very well educated with a 
GHJUHHLQPDWKHPDWLFVDQGWZR\HDUV¶WUDLQLQJ2QHIDFWRUWKDWVHWWKLVFDVHDSDUWZDVWKDW the role 
played by disgruntled former employees in spreading misinformation to potential customers.  The 
business was operational for about 18 months before, by mutual agreement, the partners decided to 
close the business. Participant B recalled:  
³It made it difficult for our company to get enough customers to keep going. So, in the end 
ZHKDGWRFORVHEXWLWZDVPXWXDO:HGLGQ¶WKDYHDQ\GHEWVWRVHWWOH´.  
Characteristics of the relationship: motives and triggers 
The fieldwork indicates that rival firms appear to have resorted to underhand tactics by undercutting 
the operations whilst luring their customers away at the same time. As Participant A recalled:  
³It was so intense that ... Some were shouting in the street about the potential damage and 
even death if they buy my products.´  
Participant G serves as another illustrative case in this direction. He had initially set up his 
EDUEHU¶VVKRSQHDURQHRI*KDQD¶VELJJHVWXQLYHUVLWLHVLQKLJKDQWLFLSDWLRQRIWKHODUJHQXPEHURI
students as a reliable customer base. However, within a short period of time several barbers opened 
next to his business ushering in an intense competitive environment. Gradually his customer base 
started to dwindle because someone was spreading misinformation that the premise was 
contaminated with the AIDS virus and eventually these factors combined to lead to a loss of 
customers to the competitors. He explained:  
³I had one customer complain and then it started that the shop was infected with the virus 
« , ZDV ORVLQJ FXVWRPHUV WR DQRWKHU EDUEHULQJ VKRS QHxt to mine ... I started selling off 
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VRPHRIWKHHTXLSPHQW«GLGQRWWKLQNLWZDVZRUWKPHFRQWLQXLQJLQP\EXVLQHVVDQGFDUU\
on losing money.´  
Our fieldwork indicates that false rumours instigated by rival firms about the contaminated 
nature of its food (Participant J) and clothing (Participants E and V) and the potential harm to the 
business was enough to deter customers from patronage of the products and services. As for 
Participant J, it was the misinformation that the firm was serving unhygienic food and contaminated 
meat products that proved so devastating in driving its customers into the hands of the alleged 
perpetrator (see Table 2). Table 2 identifies further internal factors in failure, along with illustrative 
quotes and other businesses with similar experiences. Based on the above analysis, we propose the 
following:  
Proposition 1: Prior track record of any wrongdoing in the marketplace is more likely to 
amplify the effects of inter-firm backstabbing. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Industry/sector-specific characteristics  
Our data suggest that in nine of the case firms/participants (A, C, E, G, H, M, P, R and V), the 
sensitive nature of their line of businesses such as laundry, clothing store, beauty parlour, food 
outlet and beauty salon appears to have made consumers more wary of their products, leading to the 
decline. As demonstrated earlier, only 10 of participants had no previous experience; four of the 
participants possessed senior high-school qualifications and had no previous experience in the 
industry. In the case of the stationery firm (Participant D) and printing firms (Participants F, K and 
L), the rumours had minimal or no known effects on their operations relative to the nine firms. Our 
findings indicate that there appear to be three kinds of rumours in their experiences: known, 
unknown and post-exit known rumours perpetrated by rivals, which affected the firms and their 
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operations. Our findings indicate that misinformation and spreading false rumours undermined 
firms brand and product quality in the eyes of customers. Such actions are transmitted through word 
of mouth and trade hawkers to divert customers away from their business through these rumours. 
As participant G explained:  
³The street hawkers ZHUHSDLGWRWHOOSRWHQWLDOFXVWRPHUVWKDWWKHFORWKHVZH¶UHVHOOLQJZHUH
removed from the dead and direct them to the rival store.´   
Interestingly enough, this rumour was particularly effective because using materials such as 
jewels or clothing materials from the dead has historically been regarded as an abomination or 
taboo. In another case, rumours were spread that a restaurant was serving dog and cat meat, which 
were not staple meats within the local areas. These observations are in line with the observations by 
Harvey (1989: 274) that ³backstabbing is not a crime committed by a solitary individual acting in 
isolation. Rather, it is an intricate kaleidoscope of collusive deception that involves the complicity 
of a wide variety of perpetrators, messengers, witnesses and victims´. As Participant T asserted:  
³,XVHGWRWKLQNWKH\ZHUHIULHQGVZKRZDQWHGIDLUFRPSHWLWLRQLQWKHDUHD«DOOWKDWKHZDV
doing was spreading rumours and stabbing me in the dark.´  
One other possible explanation why they saw the deviance as a betrayal of trust was that in 
some cases (Participants E, J, I, M and R), the participant claimed that the perpetrators were people 
they regarded as friends. As Participant J remarked: 
³Our children go to the same school so I meet her (alleged perpetrator) most days of the 
week at the school gate ... it is sad to know that some people have such a dark side to them.´ 
Uncovering underhand tactics 
In most of these cases, the firms only discovered the full extent of the rumours and their widespread 
nature after the business collapsed.  Most of the former business owners attributed the demise partly 
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to rumour spreading by rival ILUPV¶ intent on undermining trust among customers and engineering a 
switch to the rival. Also, an attempt to engage in such action enabled the rival business to charge 
artificially higher prices. As Participant M asserted: 
³The customers did not know that was false information, they just simply stopped buying our 
products and some passed it on to their frLHQGVDQG IDPLO\« LQ WKHHQGZH VXIIHUHG WKH
consequences. Even to this day, she continues to claim she did not spread any rumours.´ 
Our data revealed that the rumours appear to have undermined the basis of competition and 
delivered the perpetrators a competitive advantage in luring the customers of the tainted firms. The 
firms who had such suspicions attempted to respond by confronting the alleged perpetrator who 
denied any involvement. However, eventually the firm failed to generate a turnaround. In this 
particular case, the activities occurred around Christmas which meant that the firm lost out to rivals 
in the busiest season of the year. This is particularly important because consumers in general tend to 
believe rumours which are to the detriment of the former owners. In most cases the businesses were 
too small to be able to afford radio announcements to counter the rumours and therefore, they were 
powerless in quelling any spreading of rumours about their operations. Following the confrontation, 
the spread of false information ceased temporarily but continued until the doors of the business 
were closed for good. What made this rumour most damaging to the business was the effect of the 
confrontation. New vicious rumours kept cropping up again and again to the detriment of the 
business. The spread of rumours became a major issue for the businesses and stifled their ability to 
borrow money locally due to perceived risk to the business and the uncertain nature of its finances.  
Debilitating effects  
Our data indicates that the spread of misinformation imposed burdens on the businesses about the 
complicated ethical and moral dilemmas involved in responding to such underhand tactics. In some 
cases Participants K, L and M engaged in impression management in an attempt to counter the 
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rumours that it did not work. To these firms, the false rumours were a real scourge which they were 
never able to overcome. The participants engaged in public promotion using a local radio station, 
however, there was not enough revenue to continue any major campaign and consequently the 
businesses closed down. In most cases, the firms were unable to trace the source of the false 
information at the time. However, with the passage of time after the business collapsed, it became 
clear to some that the rivals on the same street or locality were often behind them. As Participant K 
also states:  
³I denied one rumour and then the next rumour appears within days from nowhere. The way 
they (rival family business) looked at me I knew it was them «QRZHYHQWKH\ZLOODGPLWLW
was their work.´ 
Of all the former business owners consulted for the study, only two admitted to employing 
the same tactics in responding to the misinformation. Two of the Participants (T and H) actually 
responded by spreading rumours themselves about their alleged perpetrator. One explanation for 
this response came from Participant H, who noted:  
³7KHµQNRQNRQVD¶LHmisinformation) was becoming too much to handle. My business was 
losing out and I had to fight fire with fire.´  
Even with these two cases, the firms were eventually overpowered by the ferocity and 
powerful nature of the actions of the rivals. The spread of malicious rumours appears to have 
become a strategy for the firms to outcompete their rivals. Even in a case where the source was 
traced to a rival at the time, the authorities were unwilling to devote resources to what was seen as a 
trivial issue. Participant J explained that an attempt to get the police to investigate that matter came 
to an end when she was turned away by the police who indicated to her that rumours were too 
trivial an issue to be handled by the police. The participant noted:  
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³He was making profit because the wife was spreading all the false rumours in the locality 
that we sourced our materials from criminals´.  
Another Participant (J) took different action to respond. In this case, one of the workers was 
doing regular patrols up and down the main street of the store to ensure that no one in the 
neighbourhood was spreading falsehoods about the business. However, a lack of effective actions to 
challenge and seek out those responsible for the misinformation allowed a false impression to 
ferment and thereby contributed to their demise. The rumours interacted with other factors such as 
increasing competition, limited technical and managerial expertise, and withdrawal of co-RZQHUV¶
support that sealed the fate of the businesses. The spread of rumours ushered in a new competitive 
game rooted in µdirty tactics¶ whereby the rival firms were good in undercutting their customer base 
and putting them on the path to decline.  
In all the cases affected by the rumours, the alleged perpetrators of the negative false 
rumours were rival firms. The relative success enjoyed by the firms appears to be the main driver in 
the spread false and damaging information about the business and its products. The firms were 
doing relatively well before the rumours arose about the defective products and poor service which 
forced some clients and customers to switch to the rivals. With regard to the rivals, it appears that 
disseminating such false information not only enabled them to win customers from their rivals but 
also sealed their fate. As Participant C remarked: 
³He knew what he was doing and did everything to succeed. As the time, a saw two for a 
two-week period selling towels outside my store, but I did not know they were being paid to 
approach my potential customers to warn them. I thought we were friendly neighbours and 
they stabbed me in the back.´ 
Our data also indicate that backstabbing and spreading of misinformation appears to have 
surged in response to increased competition in small localities. Interestingly enough, the primary 
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aim of the perpetrators appears to be to gain an edge in competing for customers, but in their actions 
appear to have pushed the firms towards bankruptcy. Another recurring theme from the fieldwork 
was the increasing admission by all the firms that rumours and misinformation were not solely 
responsible for their demise, but interacted with other factors. Participant U illustrates this by noting 
that:  
³I really needed an accountant or someone who knew about business to help me out; it was 
QRWHDV\DWDOO,GRQ¶WIHHOYHU\JRRGDERXWLWEXWZHVKDOOVHHZKDWWKHIXWXUHKROGV´ 
These findings are also presented below: 
Proposition 2: $QHQWUHSUHQHXU¶VVZLIWUHVSRQVHWRPLVLQIRUPDWLRQE\ULYDOVLVPRUHOLNHO\
to curtail the negative effects. 
Suppressing the dark-side effects 
In this section, we turn our attention to the post-failure experiences and lessons learned. Our study 
uncovered three main camps in their post-exit experiences of business failure largely stemming 
from inter-firm backstabbing: positive, negative and mixed experiences. One perspective indicates 
that rather than failure serving as a barrier to future success, some Participants (A, B, C, F, H, J, N 
and P) saw failure as an important learning experience. Participant A puts it this way:   
³A first step on the long road to business success, nobody said that running my own 
business was going to be easy«I learnt that you need to prepare adequately for all 
eventualities before starting a business.´ 
Participant P had started a modelling agency from a humble beginning and managed to 
create a successful agency for some time before the collapse. He has now been able to restart 
another business after obtaining financial backing from friends. He elaborated:  
 20 
³It is my vision that keeps me going; without that I would have given up completely. There 
ZHUHWLPHVZKHQ,FRXOGQ¶WEHOLHYHKRZEDGO\WKLQJs were going ... I learned so much when 
the business went bust. I will not make the same mistakes again. I believe I am in a stronger 
position than I was before, am ready for anything and I can handle whatever comes now.´  
The other perspective suggests that inter-firm backstabbing also leads to formation of 
negative perception of former competitors and their organisations. A number of Participants (B, C, 
D, G, H, I, J, P and K) have experienced negative effects stemming from the failure of the 
businesses. For instance, Participant J found the experience of losing her business particularly 
traumatising. After an arduous process to secure a loan to start her food services business and 
betrayal of trust by colleagues and rival businesses she thought were interested in fair competition, 
led to the business failure. Prior to the collapse she had been very trusting of people. However, after 
the failure she felt:  
³,ZDVVRVWXSLG IRU WUXVWLQJRWKHUV«,VWLOOFDQQRWEHOLHYHZKDWKDSSHQHG, ILQG LWYHU\
difficult to trust anyone, and remembering what happened is very difficult for me, I am 
really hurt.´ 
Participant B echoed this experience noting: 
³I am now scared to start another business in case it fails; the last time was very difficult for 
me. I have really struggled to find my feet again; I think it will be a long time before I 
attempt to start another business. But by the grace of God all things are possible.´  
Inter-firm backstabbing appears to have also undermined the relationships between the former 
owners and their rival firms even after the business failure. Participant I noted that: 
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 ³The people you think you know and trust can be very different once you start doing 
business with them. I lost a lot of money because I thought I could trust these people, but I 
turned out to be very wrong; I will not do the same thing again.´ 
Participant C expressed parallel sentiments: 
 ³,W¶V DOO FRPH WR QRWKLQJ SHRSOH ZKR GRQ¶W NQRZ ZKDW KDSSHQHG NHHS DVNLQJ PH KRZ
EXVLQHVVLVJRLQJDQGVRPHWLPHV,VD\ILQHEHFDXVH,GRQ¶t want them to know; people look 
DW\RXIXQQ\VRPHWLPHVLI\RXVD\\RXUEXVLQHVVZHQWEXVWOLNH\RX¶UHDIDLOXUH´  
In a similar manner Participant K, expressed the loss in terms of customer loyalty. He gave the 
following words of caution in relation to inability to deal with adverse rumours:  
³Customer loyalty is very important. I know that you have to do everything you can in order 
to gain that loyalty, but you can lose it very quickly if any bad rumours start going round 
about your business.´  
The third and final theme to emerge here is that some Participants (e.g., B, C, H, J and P) 
have experienced both negative and positive effects of business failure. Although other factors 
played a key role in the demise of the business, most of the business owners attribute their 
predicament to largely the rumours in tandem with other factors. Figure 1 summarises the above 
findings.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Discussion and conclusion 
Our study set out to examine how inter-firm backstabbing interacts with other factors to precipitate 
business failures. Using insights from former business owners in Ghana, our study uncovered that 
most firms had their fates sealed by misinformation and rumours perpetrated by their rivals as a 
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strategy to lure their customers and undermine their businesses. The rumours and misinformation 
peddled by rival firms were particularly potent in not only losing their customers, but it also 
undercutting the business by derailing their limited successes. We found that rumours were made 
more potent when combined with other factors such as prior history of poor quality and faulty 
SURGXFWV LQGXVWU\ VHQVLWLYLW\ RI ILUPV¶ SURGXFWV DQG VHUYLFHV DQG LQWHQVH FRPSHWLWLRQ IURP ULYDO
firms.  
Despite the prevailing assertion that rumours and misinformation may be less harmful to businesses, 
ZHXQFRYHUHGWKDWZKHQLQWHUDFWLQJZLWKRWKHUIDFWRUVLWFDQTXLFNHQWKHSDFHRIVPDOOEXVLQHVVHV¶
decline and eventual exit. Our study also uncovered that inter-firm backstabbing leads former 
business owners to form a negative perception of former competitors and their organisations after 
their business collapsed. In addition, the lack and weak enforcement of the ³rules of the game´ have 
GHUDLOHGWKHILUP¶VDWWempt to respond to backstabbing by rival firms. Even in cases where the firms 
decided to counter the rumours with rumours, they were largely ineffective in altering their 
misfortunes.  
Contributions to theory  
Our study further makes three main contributions to entrepreneurship and business failure literature. 
First, although some studies have emerged on backstabbing in organisations (Einwiller and Kamins, 
2008) and business failure (Watson and Everett, 1993), a lack of integration of these two promising 
streams of research has obscured the progress made. Our study fills this void in our understanding 
by shedding light on how informal practices such as spread of rumours and misinformation interact 
with other factors to precipitate business failure. The study adds to the growing body of scholarly 
works which have suggested a need to broaden our understanding of the causes of business failure 
(see Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2010). In addition, the study adds to the growing body of research 
rooted in institutional theory, which have suggested a need for effective legal enforcement regime 
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to foster the development of new and resource-poor new businesses (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).  
Furthermore, despite the assertion that inter-firm backstabbing is a feature in the competitive 
marketplace in underdeveloped economies, our understanding of how it unfolds and precipitates 
business failure has remained largely overlooked. As demonstrated here, in some developing 
countries such underhand factors remain a feature in competitive interactions. Thus, our study shed 
OLJKW RQ WKH XQGHUKDQG WDFWLFV ZKLFK SURYLGH IXUWKHU LQVLJKW LQWR WKH ³ZDON RQ WKH GDUN VLGH´ RI
inter-firm rivalry (Ferris and King, 1991; Vaughan, 1999; Pozner, 2008), a largely overlooked area 
by scholars. Moreover, some scholars have suggested brand switching by core customers as a 
reason for underperformance and failure (Burt, Mellahi, Jackson and Sparks, 2002); we contribute 
to this stream of research by examining the mechanism through which adverse rumours manifest. In 
so doing, we contribute to entrepreneurship research (Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997).  
Contributions to practice  
Notwithstanding the theoretical contributions, our findings also hold practical implications. From a 
public policy standpoint, unlike large businesses that have the financial resources and expertise to 
respond to rumours and misinformation, small entrepreneurs in the developing world often lack 
access to financial capital and expertise to enable them to achieve such goals. Therefore, there is a 
need for governments in such developing economies to develop, strengthen and enforce the ³rules 
of the game´ in relation to sabotage by rival firms. There is also a need to create fast and reliable 
legal avenues that enable small businesses to end malicious dissemination of false misinformation 
TXLFNO\ DQG WR VHHNGDPDJHV WR UHSDLU WKHLU UHSXWDWLRQ ,Q DGGLWLRQ JRYHUQPHQWV¶SROLFLHVJHDUHG
towards increasing the punishment for such behaviour is more likely to reduce sabotage and foster 
innovation and fairer competition in the marketplace.  
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From a practical standpoint, our findings indicate that there is a need for small businesses to 
engage in more publicity and public relations to help develop a brand image as a strategic response 
to counter rumours spread by rivals. Such actions would help to minimise the effects of negative 
rumours. This is important given that ³people fill information vacuums with rumours and such 
rumours are often more dire than the truth´ (Sutton, Eisenhardt and Jucker, 1986: 24). In addition, it 
might be useful for new start-ups to seek to avoid direct head-to-head competition in a small 
locality in their infancy due to their limited market knowledge and expertise in combating and 
responding to inter-firm backstabbing in such a largely informal economy. By avoiding such direct 
competition, they might be able to reduce instances of inter-firm backstabbing.  
Regarding the limitations, one pertains to our exclusive focus on examining the issue solely 
from the perspective of the victims of negative rumours and misinformation. There is a tendency for 
UHVHDUFKSDUWLFLSDQWVWR³XQGHU-UHSRUWEHKDYLRUVGHHPHGLQDSSURSULDWHE\UHVHDUFKHUV«RYHU-report 
EHKDYLRUV YLHZHG DV DSSURSULDWH´ 'RQDOGVRQ and Grant-Vallone, 2002, p.247; Podsakoff and 
Organ, 1986). Given that individuals are more likely to attribute business failure to external factors 
rather than mismanagement or poor decisions (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015); there is a potential self-
reporting bias in our sample. A promising area for future research is to examine the issue from the 
perspective of the alleged rumour spreader to ascertain a more complete picture. This is important 
JLYHQWKDWEDFNVWDEELQJHYHQWV³VWHPVROHO\IURPWKHELDVHGYLHZSRLQWRIWKHYLFWLPV´, it might be 
SRVVLEOHWKDWWKHDOOHJHGUXPRXUVSUHDGHUPD\³KDYHQRWKLQJWRKLGHDQGLQIDFWPD\EHDOWRJHWKHU
LQQRFHQWRIWKHFULPHRIZKLFKKHRUVKHLVDFFXVHG´+DUYH\: 272). Such an analysis would 
provide unique insights into whether the failure was attributed solely to factors such as lack of effort 
on the part of the former business owner rather than misinformation.  
Future research should seek to obtain more samples from organisations that have 
experienced inter-firm backstabbing over a period of time and survived and also seek more than one 
informant per firm. Such approaches would provide much in-depth analysis and complete analysis 
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than has been achieved here. As we have seen, entrepreneurship theory and business failure 
literature offers little insight into the effects and role of inter-firm backstabbing. In a nutshell, we 
hope that this study serves as a catalyst for more scholarly works on the subject. 
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Table 2: Dimensions of rumours induced by inter-firm backstabbing  





³3HRSOH MXVW GHVWUR\HG P\ EXVLQHVV MXVW PDNLQJ WKLQJV XS ,
WKLQNLQWKHIRRGEXVLQHVV\RXUFRPSHWLWRUVFDQGHVWUR\\RX´
(Participant J) 
E, H, J, I, M 
and R 
Rumours induced 
by intense rivalry 
³:KHQ WKH\ VWDUWHG QH[W GRRU UXPRXUV FDPH IURP QRZKHUH
that my shop was infected with AIDS virus and we were 
spreading it to customers ... I was losing customers to another 
barbering shop, they stole all my customers. I was just sitting 
in the shop with my friends, it was costing money, and I had 
WRFORVH´3DUWLFLSDQW* 




gossip and falling 
demand 
³7KH VKRS VWDUWHG ORVLQJ FXVWRPHUV VORZO\ EHFDXVH VRPH
people started the gossips that were not from different ethnic 




D and F  
No rumour effects ³, KDYH QR NQRZOHGJH ZKHWKHU UXPRXUV SOD\HG D SDUW´
(Participant F) 





Table 1: Summary and details of informants and their businesses   
Cases Founders/ 
Participants 




Industry  Number of 
employees 
Age of firm at 
time of exit 
1.  A None SHS  Provision store 3 11 months 
2.  B 2 years training from college BSC Mathematics Communications  5 2 years 
3.  C Management/marketing None Laundry  8 2 and half years 
4.  D Previous sales experience None Stationery  3 8 months 
5.  E Worked in retail None Clothing store 11 1 year and a half 
6.  F None JHS graduate ICT Printing press  10 3 years 
7.  G None  SHS Barber store 5 6 months 
8.  H None  SHS Beauty parlour  7 9 months 
9.  I Customer service/sales  SHS Car rental  14 2 and a half years 
10.  J Previous restaurant experience  SHS Bar/restaurant  13 6 months 
11.  K None SHS Printing press 17 9 months 
12.  L Employed in printing press SHS Printing press 8 2 years 
13.  M None JHS Bar/restaurant 12 6 months 
14.  N Recruitment agency/ marketing 
and project management 
None Communication services 5 3 and half years 
15.  O None SHS / Business School 
graduate 
Communication services 7 1 and half years 
16.  P None SHS Modelling agency  13 2 and half years 
17.  Q Teacher 0DVWHU¶V'HJUHH Satellite support services 6 3 and a half years 
18.  R Bartender SHS Diploma Beauty salon  9 2 years 
19.  S Workshop employee SHS Susu (Financial services-
micro-financing) 
15 1 year 
20.  T None None Mechanics 11 8 months 
21.  U None   JHS Electrical services 5 14 months 
22.  V None JHS Clothing store 7 4 months 
Note: In the Qualifications column: SHS; Senior High School; JHS: Junior High School 
